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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court's decision in United Paperworkers
International Union v. Misco,1 it has been well established that courts can
review arbitration awards for violations of public policy. Misco provides the
framework for determining whether awards can be vacated on public policy
grounds in spite of the traditional judicial deference accorded to arbitration.
As explained in Misco, courts have only a limited role in reviewing
arbitration decisions because excessive judicial interference would
undermine the use of arbitration as an alternative means for settling
disputes. 2 Still, the Supreme Court also stated that a court may vacate an
award if it is shown that the award violates explicit, well-defined, and
dominant public policy ascertained from law and legal precedents.3
The Supreme Court recently revisited some of the questions surrounding
public policy review of arbitration awards in Eastern Associated Coal
Corporation v. UMWA, District 17.4 In this decision the Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed the basic test of Misco that an award may only be
vacated on public policy grounds if it violates some explicit, well defined,
and dominant source of public policy ascertained from positive law and not
general concerns for supposed public interests.
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1 United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
2 Id. at 37-38. In Misco the Court conducted a lengthy analysis of its decision in
Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1963). The Court
concluded that the deference shown to arbitrators is itself compelled by the dominant
public policy favoring private settlement of labor disputes as expressed by Congress in
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §173(d). Id.
3 Id. at 43.
4 E. Associated Coal Corp. v. UMWA, Dist. 17, 121 S. Ct. 462 (2000).
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Public policy scrutiny under Misco was intended to be a narrow
exception to the traditional judicial deference accorded to arbitration
decisions.5 This intent was clearly confirmed by all nine Justices in Eastern
Associated Coal.6 However, deciding what constitutes sufficiently well-
defined and dominant public policy for reversing an award, and whether that
award does indeed violate public policy, remains difficult as the use of
arbitration as a means of alternative dispute resolution grows. Arbitration is
now a widespread device for resolving disputes in numerous fields. Awards
are therefore more likely to implicate and possibly violate one or more of the
numerous expressions of public policy embodied in the growing myriad of
statutes, regulations, and common law doctrines governing parties'
contractual relationships.
This Article will discuss how courts have interpreted the principal
elements of public policy scrutiny outlined in Misco, as well as the burdens
faced by parties seeking vacatur of awards on public policy grounds. These
burdens vary because the federal circuit courts have taken different views of
areas where Misco was silent. Some of these cases must be re-examined in
light of Eastern Associated Coal, which clarified the appropriate inquiry for
courts engaged in public policy review in a way which runs contrary to the
approaches taken by some federal circuit courts. Also discussed are trends in
decisions reviewing awards implicating specific public policy issues such as
workplace safety, sexual harassment, employee drug use, and violence in the
workplace. Though arbitrators retain broad discretion when issuing their
awards and the scope of public policy review will always be very narrow,7
current case law demonstrates that if certain public policies are violated,
parties can still overcome the strong deference courts show toward
arbitration.
5 Misco, 484 U.S. at 42-43 ("tI]t is apparent that our decision in [W.R .Grace] does
not ... sanction a broad judicial power to set aside arbitration awards as against public
policy.") (discussing an important legal point derived from the decision in W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, & Plastic
Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).
6 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority of seven justices and joined in the result by
a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia, noted that the relief of public policy vacatur was
appropriate only in "rare" instances. E. Associated Coal, 121 S. Ct. at 466.
7 Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n v. Pro-Football, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 71, 75-76
(D.D.C. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 56 F.3d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (comparing the
likelihood of success of vacating an award with a public policy argument to the
likelihood of completing a "Hail Mary" pass in a football game, a desperate attempt to
score that is rarely successful).
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II. FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW
In order to overturn an arbitration award on public policy grounds, Misco
requires a showing that the award violates explicit, well-defined, and
dominant public policy rooted in law and legal precedents. 8 Such policy must
be clearly articulated by any party seeking vacatur. What constitutes explicit,
well-defined, and dominant public policy varies, but courts have held such
policy exists when the alleged rule is expressed in statutes, regulations, or
clear common law doctrines.9
In Eastern Associated Coal, the split among the Justices centered solely
on the appropriate definition of public policy. Justice Breyer's majority
opinion in Eastern Associated Coal, joined by six Justices, affirmed the
lower court's application of the Misco standard to mean vacatur is
appropriate when an award violates "positive law."' 0 For the employer in
Eastern Associated Coal, this meant seeking prohibitions in federal statutes
and federal regulations governing drug testing of licensed commercial drivers
against the reinstatement of repeat drug users, and the Justices found no such
prohibition." If the majority had stopped there, Eastern Associated Coal
could be interpreted as rejecting any public policy challenges not based on
statutory or regulatory prohibitions on the terms of an award.
But then the majority indicated it would be permissible for courts to find
public policy violations in situations where awards did not violate positive
law.12 Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion criticized the majority for in
effect inviting what he deemed to be "flaccid" public policy challenges based
not on clear statutory or regulatory prohibitions. In his view public policy
violations only occur when an award is clearly contrary to "actual
prohibitions of the law." 13
In light of Eastern Associated Coal, which -demonstrated that well-
defined and dominant public policy governs an issue, it can be a significant
hurdle for parties seeking vacatur, particularly in cases where the alleged
public policy is not rooted in statutes, regulations, or clear common law but
8 Misco, 484 U.S. at 43.
9 See, e.g., Deanna J. Mouser, Analysis of the Public Policy Exception After
Paperworkers v. Misco: A Proposal to Limit the Public Policy Exception and to Allow the
Parties to Submit the Public Policy Question to the Arbitrator, 12 INDUs. REL. L.J. 89
(1990).
10 E. Associated Coal, 121 S. Ct. at 467.
11 Id. at 468-69.
12 1d. at 469. ("We agree, in principle, that courts' authority to invoke the public
policy exception is not limited solely to instances where the arbitration award itself
violates positive law.").
13 1d. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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rather is only expressed in the internal policies of an employer or trade
association, or in general concerns about supposed public interests. 14
Moreover, while the Supreme Court in Eastern Associated Coal left open the
door for successful public policy challenges absent express statutory
prohibitions against the terms of awards, there is clearly only limited chance
for success absent positive law expressly militating against enforcement of
an award.
The other key question when challenging awards on public policy
grounds is whether a party needs to demonstrate that the terms of the award
itself, such as the remedy offered by the arbitrator, violates the public policy
at issue. The Justices in Misco were purposefully silent on whether courts
should consider the terms of an arbitrator's decision, the reasoning therein, or
the conduct which is the subject of the dispute, when looking for violations
of the articulated public policy.15 The discrepancies among various federal
circuit courts in public policy cases derive largely from whether the
particular reviewing court determines that it must compare the terms of an
award to the relevant public policy, instead of simply comparing the public
policy goals to the conduct at issue. This unresolved question following
Misco created a split among the federal circuit courts.
Most federal circuit courts used what is deemed the narrow approach to
public policy review by comparing the terms of the award to the public
14See, e.g., Paine Webber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 351-52 (8th Cir. 1995)
(specifying that National Association of Securities Dealers rules and employer policies
based thereon do not constitute public policy to overturn the reinstatement of a dishonest
securities broker; even though the need for honesty in the securities industry is a
dominant policy, it is not sufficiently well-defined to satisfy Misco); United Transp.
Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 382 (3d Cir. 1995) (observing
that general considerations for public safety do not provide sufficiently explicit public
policy grounds to vacate an award reinstating a bus driver who was involved in repeated
rear-end collisions); Ariz. Elec. Power Coop. v. Berkeley, 59 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that no well-defined and dominant public policy exists forbidding the
collection of fees by unethical attorneys); Schiltz v. Burlington N. R.R., 115 F.3d 1407,
1414 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding no well-defined and dominant public policy of job
protection based on job security and seniority provisions in a collective bargaining
agreement); Major League Umpires Ass'n v. Prof'l Baseball Clubs, No. 96-7437, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14215, at *7 n.10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1997), aff'd, 159 F.3d 1352 (3d
Cir. 1998) (noting that the public policy exception is inappropriate for review of an award
denying back pay to professional baseball umpires because presumably no well-defined
and dominant public policy exists requiring payment of umpires for unplayed games).
15 United Paperworks Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 45 n.12 (1987) ("We need
not address the Union's position that a court may refuse to enforce an award on public
policy grounds only when the award itself violates a statute, regulation, or other
manifestation of positive law, or compels conduct by the employer that would violate
such a law.").
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policy at issue. In the Ninth Circuit a court must find that a clear, well-
defined, and dominant public policy exists and that the terms of an award are
directly contrary to that policy in order for an award to be vacated on public
policy grounds.' 6 As such, except in the unlikely event that a statute or
regulation expressly forbids the decision rendered by the arbitrator, courts
must defer to the arbitrator's award. A similar narrow approach is followed
in the Second Circuit, where awards will be vacated on public policy grounds
only in the "rare cases" in which their enforcement would be "directly at
odds" with some well-defined and dominant public policy.' 7
Additionally, if a court is required to compare the terms of the award to
the given policy, it may be necessary for the court to conclude that the award
undermines the entire underlying purpose of that public policy in order to
vacate the award on these grounds. Consequently, awards that somehow limit
the ability of an employer to achieve what public policy requires of it, but do
not entirely prohibit the employer from doing so, need not be vacated. The
New York Court of Appeals took this position recently in refusing to vacate
arbitration awards on public policy grounds, perhaps creating an additional
burden on parties seeking vacatur on this basis.18
In Eastern Associated Coal the Supreme Court adhered to the so called
narrow approach applied by the Fourth Circuit and most other federal circuit
courts, namely that a reviewing court must find the terms of an award, not
the underlying conduct at issue, violated public policy.'9 In clarifying the
focus for public policy review Justice Breyer noted that since the parties had
"bargained for" the "arbitrator's construction" of the agreement in awards, a
court must assume the challenged award is part of the agreement.Y Therefore,
it is the terms of the agreement itself, expressed by an arbitrator's
interpretation, which is subject to court review on public policy grounds.2' In
light of Eastern Associated Coal, case law which has found violations of
public policy in awards based on the underlying conduct, rather than
16 United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 588 v. Foster Poultry
Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 174 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United Transp. Union v. Union Pac.
R.R., 116 F.3d 430, 433 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l
Union, 74 F.3d at 174).
17 Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. SEIU, Dist. 1199, 116 F.3d 41,46 (2d Cir. 1997).
18 Prof'l, Clerical, & Technical Employees Ass'n v. Buffalo Bd. of Educ., 683
N.E.2d 733, 745 (N.Y. 1997); New York State Corr. Officers & Police Benevolent Ass'n
v. New York, 726 N.E.2d 462,467 (N.Y. 1999).
19E. Associated Coal Corp. v. LMWA, Dist. 17, 121 S. Ct. 462, 467-68 (2000).
20Id. at 466 (citation omitted).
21 Id. at 467. ("[W]e must treat the arbitrator's award as if it represented an
agreement between Eastern and the union as to the proper meaning of the contract's
words .... For present purposes, the award is not distinguishable from the contractual
agreement.") (citation omitted).
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comparing the terms of the award to the public policy at issue, is now
suspect.
III. PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW OF
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AwARDs
Vacatur of a labor arbitration award on public policy grounds is very
unlikely given the narrow scope of this exception in post Misco
jurisprudence. It is even less likely when courts review commercial
arbitration awards. This is because the public policy exception has very
limited relevance in the context of commercial arbitration. In Misco Justice
White noted that court authority to review awards for violations of public
policy stems from the doctrine that courts will not "lend... aid to one who
founds a cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act."'22 Actions for
breaches of commercial contracts rarely implicate such concerns. 23 In
addition, courts have declared that the Federal Arbitration Act manifests a
strong federal policy favoring arbitration of commercial disputes. 24
Still, parties often contend that commercial arbitrators violate public
policy by enforcing or suspending commercial contractual obligations, albeit
with little success. 25 For example, the plaintiff in one commercial case
contended unsuccessfully that an arbitrator violated public policy by
awarding damages which put the prevailing party in a better position than if
the contract had not been breached. 26 The plaintiff also contended, without
success, that it was a violation of public policy for the arbitrator to have
awarded more damages than could have been won by the prevailing party in
a judicial proceeding. 27
Parties seeking vacatur of commercial arbitration awards have also
advanced unsuccessful public policy arguments based on allegedly improper
evidentiary admissions. In Gallus Investments, L.P. v. Pudgie's Chicken,
22 Misco, 484 U.S. at 42.
23 See Widell v. Wolf, 43 F.3d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir. 1994) (characterizing as
"frivolous" an appeal seeking vacatur on public policy grounds of an award granting
damages to the customer of a commodities broker who engaged in unauthorized trades).
24 9 U.S.C. §1-16 (1994 & Supp. 2000). For a discussion of Congressional intent to
express policy favoring arbitration of commercial disputes, see Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316 (9th Cir.
1996).
25 See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Kimball & Assocs., 860 F.2d 683, 686-88 (6th
Cir. 1988) (holding that service contracts entered into by a municipality that were ultra
vires and had indefinite terms did not violate public policy).
26 Team Scandia, Inc. v. Greco, 6 F. Supp. 2d 795, 802 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
27 Id. at 802.
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Inc.,28 an award resolving the parties' dispute under a franchise agreement
was challenged as lacking "fundamental fairness" because the arbitration
panel considered evidence of a settlement offer.29 The plaintiff argued this
was a violation of New York evidentiary law, the jurisdiction governing the
contract, and also that allowing such a practice in arbitration would chill
settlement negotiations as well as undermine policies favoring the use of
alternative dispute resolution.30 The court noted this evidentiary law public
policy argument was vague at best and did not approach the level of a Misco
public policy violation.31 Such cases demonstrate how unlikely it is that
courts will set aside commercial awards on public policy grounds, despite
creative efforts by the losing parties to identify policy violations in
commercial awards.32
IV. WORKPLACE SAFETY AND PUBLIC POLICY
It is important to consider the strength and breadth of the public policy at
issue when assessing whether an award is likely to be vacated. With a
stronger and broader public policy, courts may be wary of any potential
dilution of the policy's purposes. Such concerns are evident in a series of
cases dealing with employees in safety sensitive jobs. Some courts reviewing
awards that reinstated employees to safety sensitive jobs choose to apply a
broad approach to public policy review. This involves comparing the conduct
at issue to the relevant public policy. Using this approach, contrary to how
public policy review was applied in Eastern Associated Coal, courts have
vacated awards reinstating employees whose conduct created serious risks of
harm to others by jeopardizing safety in the workplace.
For instance, in Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. v. Local Union 204,33
the Eighth Circuit affirmed vacatur of an award reinstating a nuclear power
28 Gallus Investments, L.P. v. Pudgie's Chicken, Inc, 134 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 1998).
2 9 Id. at 234.
30 Ld. at 233-34.
31 Id. at 234 n.*.
3 2 E.g., Bowles Fin. Group v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1013 (10th Cir.
1994) (holding that consideration of a settlement offer does not violate public policy or
deprive a party of a fundamentally fair arbitration hearing); Nitram, Inc. v. Indus. Risk
Insurers, 848 F. Supp. 160, 166 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (ruling that an arbitration panel's
consideration of testimony by an expert witness did not violate public policy); Enviro
Petroleum, Inc. v. Kondur Petroleum S.A., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1036 (S.D. Tex. 2000)
(rejecting contention that contractual arbitration provision allowing for arbitration under
the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce was contrary to
public policy because awards issued thereunder would be unenforceable in Indonesia, the
country where the defendant was based).
33 Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987).
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plant employee who deliberately disregarded federal safety regulations and
his supervisor's instructions by initiating the release of a pressurized door
lock meant to prevent radioactive leaks. The court found that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission guidelines promulgated for compliance with the
Atomic Energy Act mandated such safeguards, and these guidelines
constituted explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy.34 These
regulations had been deliberately disobeyed by the discharged employee, and
the court reasoned that this "knowing violation of a safety rule" mandated by
clear public policy required his discharge.35
Courts in these safety sensitive employment cases are often presented
with the argument that employers and the public should not bear the risk of
an employee repeating conduct which could harm others. Nevertheless,
despite the strong public policy at issue when public safety is potentially
jeopardized by an employee's conduct, the determining factor for most courts
in safety cases has been whether the employer can demonstrate some
sufficiently well-defined and dominant public policy requiring removal of
employees who create severe risks to co-workers or the general public.
The Second Circuit addressed this issue when reviewing the
reinstatement of a nuclear power plant employee to a safety sensitive job
who, upon being selected for a drug test, altered his urine sample and then
subsequently tested positive for cocaine. In IBEW, Local 97 v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp.(Niagara Mohawk 1),36 an arbitration panel reviewed
the discharge of Patrick Rando, a chemistry technician at a nuclear power
plant who falsified his drug test specimen. Rando's job required chemical
testing of various operational mechanisms at the plant to ensure compliance
with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) safety guidelines. 37
All employees were subject to random testing pursuant to other NRC
rules intended to guarantee employee fitness and plant safety. 38 Rando was
selected to undergo drug testing but the sample he submitted was later
determined to be tainted by chemicals meant to conceal any traces of drugs. 39
He was required to submit a second sample under observation, and this one
tested positive for cocaine. 40 The company immediately terminated him on
the grounds he had deliberately falsified a federally mandated drug test, and
34 Id. at 1428.
35 Id. at 1429.
36 IBEW, Local 97 v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Niagara Mohawk 1), 143 F.3d
704 (2d Cir. 1998), rev'g 950 F. Supp. 1227, 1234 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
37 Id. at 707.
38 Niagara Mohawk I, 143 F.3d at 707.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 707.
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that such deceitful conduct made him too untrustworthy and unreliable for
his safety sensitive position in a nuclear facility.41
However, the arbitration panel reviewing his grievance found no just
cause existed for discharge because the employer's drug testing guidelines,
created in order to comply with the NRC regulations, did not list termination
as a penalty for adulterating a test sample.42 These guidelines only stated
such conduct was to be treated like a positive test, the first of which would
result in a suspension of up to two weeks and subsequent monitoring of the
employee.43 The panel ordered conditional reinstatement provided he passed
another drug test, and as additional discipline Rando was ordered to undergo
further testing and evaluation for eighteen months.44 If he failed another drug
test he could then be discharged.45
The employer refused to reinstate Rando and instead sought vacatur of
the award. The district court vacated the award, concluding it was barred by
express, well-defined, -and dominant public policy against employment of
persons at nuclear facilities who deliberately violated safety regulations. 46
The district court agreed with the employer that Rando's conduct
demonstrated he was not sufficiently trustworthy or reliable enough to
resume his former employment, and that reinstating him would be contrary to
public policy.47
The Second Circuit reversed the district court in a lengthy opinion
discussing the role of courts engaged in public policy review under Misco.4 8
The court defined this task as determining whether the terms of the award
itself, rather than the reasoning underlying it, expressly conflicts with clear,
well-defined, and dominant public policy.49 It also concluded that this
analytical framework for public policy review under Misco, requiring
examination of the end result of an award for violations of public policy, was
the only approach that could balance traditional court deference to arbitration
with concerns about public policy, despite the holdings of some federal
circuit courts to the contrary.50
41 Id. at 708.
4 2 Id.
43 Id.
4 4 Id.
45Id.
46 Niagara Mohawk 1, 950 F. Supp. 1227, 1234 (N.D.N.Y. 1996), rev'd 143 F.3d
704 (2d Cir. 1998).
47 Id. at 1236.
4 8 Niagara Mohawk 1, 143 F.3d 704,714-17.
49 Id. at 716-17.
50 1d. at 717. The Second Circuit distinguished Iowa Electric and. other cases
addressed in this article.
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Using this test the court determined that the NRC regulations requiring
drug testing, the clearest source of public policy relevant to the award,
neither mandated termination for adulterating drug tests nor forbade
conditional reinstatement after a negative test.51 Moreover, the company's
argument that Rando' s deceptive conduct made him so untrustworthy that his
reinstatement contravened public policy was deemed unpersuasive, even
though the regulations clearly called for employees to be trustworthy. 52 In
the court's view the importance of trustworthiness and reliability expressed
in the NRC regulations did not indicate in an explicit, well-defined manner
that dishonest conduct during a drug test would make an employee so
untrustworthy to preclude reinstatement.53 Despite his deceit Rando could be
conditionally reinstated because no rule or regulation made such dishonesty a
violation of public policy.54
The Second Circuit closely followed its reasoning in Niagara I in a
subsequent case involving an award reinstating a nuclear plant safety officer
who had failed to properly respond to a fire alarm and then lied to
investigators about his actions. In Local 97, IBEW v. Niagara Mohawk
51 Id. at 718. According to the NRC Regulations, fitness-for-duty programs must do
the following:
(a) Provide reasonable assurance that nuclear power plant personnel... will
perform their tasks in a reliable and trustworthy manner and are not under the
influence of any substance, legal or illegal... which in any way adversely affects
their ability to safely and competently perform their duties;
(b) Provide reasonable measures for the early detection of persons who are not
fit to perform activities within the scope of this part; and
(c) Have a goal of achieving a drug free workplace and a workplace free of the
effects of such substances.
General Performance Objectives, 10 C.F.R. § 26.10 (2000).
52 Niagra Mohawk 1, 143 F.3d at 719-20 n.15.
53 Id. at 721.
54 Id. at 722. Other public policy challenges based on an employee's dishonest
conduct have also been unsuccessful. E.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Local 338,
Retail, Wholesale & Dep't. Store Union, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7207 (S.D.N.Y. May 23,
1996). Here the enforcement of an award reinstating an illegal alien who was discharged
for giving false information on an employment application and other forms in order to
conceal his illegal residency in the U.S. was held not contrary to public policy against the
employment of illegal aliens and against misrepresentations by persons seeking
employment. Id. at *7. The court reasoned that though immigration law forbade hiring
illegal aliens as well as using false documents, the grievant's reinstatement would not
interfere with the employer's ongoing obligation to comply with the relevant statutes. Id.
at *6-*7.
306
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Power Corp. (Niagara Mohawk 1/), 55 the employer again refused to accept
the arbitrator's award reinstating the employee and instead sought vacatur on
public policy grounds, citing the same NRC regulations requiring
trustworthiness of nuclear plant employees. This argument was again
accepted by the district court which vacated the award.56
The Second Circuit, as it did in Niagara Mohawk I, reversed the district
court and affirmed the award. The court again noted that the public policy
exception to judicial deference to arbitration is "extremely limited," and
reiterated its view that Misco requires courts to compare the terms of an
arbitrator's award to relevant sources of public policy when assessing
whether the award is contrary to public policy.57 After re-examining the
NRC guidelines requiring employees to be both "trustworthy" and "reliable,"
as well as the results of several NRC enforcement actions brought against
nuclear plant employees who committed acts of dishonesty or
nonperformance of safety duties,58 the court again determined that no explicit
provision in the regulations forbade reinstating dishonest employees. 59
The Second. Circuit in both Niagara Mohawk I and Niagara Mohawk II
distinguished Iowa Electric on the grounds the Eighth Circuit in that case had
largely based its holding on the individual employee's egregious conduct.60
Indeed, a subsequent decision of the Eighth Circuit demonstrates that so long
as arbitrators do not reinstate employees who deliberately disregard safety in
violation of some clear and well-defined expression of public policy, that
court is also unlikely to vacate such awards on public policy grounds. 61
Iowa Electric and both Niagara Mohawk I and Niagara Mohawk I
illustrate, in part, how the differing approaches taken by circuit courts to
public policy review can produce different results. This difference reflects
the uneven development of law where Misco was silent, namely on what
exactly in an award must violate public policy to require vacatur. The law is
55 Local 97, IBEW v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Niagara Mohawk 11), 196
F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999), rev'g No. 96-CV-728 HGM-GJD, 1997 WL 793137 (N.D.N.Y.
Dec. 16, 1997).
56 Niagara Mohawk l, 196 F.3d at 122.
57 Id at 125.
58 Id. at 127-29.
59 Id at 130.
60 Niagara Mohawk 1, 723 (2d Cir. 1998); Niagara Mohawk 11, 196 F.3d 117, 131
(2d Cir. 1999).
61 See Homestake Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, Local 7044, 153 F.3d 678,
681 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Although we have expressed public policy concerns about an award
that reinstated an employee despite a finding that the employee grossly and deliberately
violated important safety regulations ... in the absence of such a finding here, no similar
concerns arise.") (citation omitted).
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now more consistent in the context of safety at nuclear facilities,62 and the
Supreme Court's analysis in Eastern Associated Coal should promote future
uniformity since it instructs courts to look to the terms of the agreement, as
expressed in the award.
Should courts continue to review awards reinstating employees to safety
sensitive positions on various job sites using different public policy tests,
they will still produce uneven results. Many decisions implicate drug use, an
issue w~hich can be addressed in both the safety sensitive and non-safety
sensitive employment contexts. In one such case a court vacated the
reinstatement of an employee whose safety sensitive job involved monitoring
high pressure equipment at a power plant.63 This employee operated
electrical equipment and was found to have a chronic drug problem. 64 He had
drugs in his car at work, and was found to have been under the influence of
drugs while on duty monitoring pressure and temperature gauges. 65 The court
reasoned that reinstating this employee violated public policy because he
created danger in the workplace, and it would compel the employer to
tolerate illegal drugs on its premises. 66
Further, in two very similar cases, Gulf Coast Industrial Workers Union
v. Exxon Co., 6 7 and Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chemical Workers
Union, 68 the Fifth Circuit vacated arbitration awards that reinstated
employees with back pay after each had failed drug tests. Both employees
worked in safety sensitive positions at chemical facilities. 69 In Gulf Coast
Industrial Workers Union, the employee was a technician with control over
the flow of highly volatile gases;70 in Baton Rouge Oil & Chemical Workers
62 Compare Niagara Mohavk 1, 143 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 1998), and Niagara Mohmvk
11, 196 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999), with Homestake Mining, 153 F.3d 678; see also Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Tenn. Valley Trades & Labor Council, 184 F.3d 510, 521 (6th Cir. 1999)
(refusing to vacate on public policy grounds an award reinstating a nuclear power plant
employee who failed a drug test, following Niagara 1).
63 Georgia Power Co. v. IBEW, Local 84, 707 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1989), affd,
896 F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 1990).
64 Id. at 533-34.
65 Id.
6 6 Id. at 538.
67 Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., 991 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1993).
68 Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union, 77 F.3d 850 (5th Cir.
1996).
69 Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union, 991 F.2d at 246; Baton Rouge Oil & Chem.
Workers Union, 77 F.3d at 851.
70 Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union, 991 F.2d at 247.
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Union, the grievant was a supervisor in a chemical purification department.7'
Both tested positive for cocaine and were discharged.72
The arbitrator in Gulf Coast Industrial Workers Union found just cause
existed for discipline, but determined that discharge was too severe a penalty
under the company's drug policy.73 The Fifth Circuit affirmed vacatur by a
lower court, finding that numerous federal and state statutes, company
guidelines, and judicial decisions all demonstrated the existence of explicit,
well-defined, and dominant public policy favoring eradication of illegal
drugs from the workplace.74 As such, the court reasoned that the
reinstatement of an employee to a safety sensitive job with back pay after
failing a drug test would undermine that policy.75
The arbitrator in Baton Rouge Oil & Chemical Workers Union decided
discharge was unwarranted because the employee had not violated the drug
policy as drafted at the time he failed the drug test.76 Here the Fifth Circuit
only had before it the issue of back pay, and it still found a violation of
public policy even though the employee did not return to his job and no
longer posed a safety risk. The court reasoned that an award granting back
pay created "retrospective approval" of the unsafe conduct.77 This rationale
was applied despite the unchallenged finding that the employee's discharge
had been without just cause under the circumstances. 78
These two Fifth Circuit decisions starkly contrast with the narrow
approach to the public policy exception applied by the Second Circuit in both
Niagara Mohawk I and IL This contrast highlights the tension present in
most court cases reviewing arbitration awards between allowing arbitration
to function without excessive judicial interference and ensuring that public
interests are protected from arbitrators who may undermine public policy in
their awards. In striking this balance, the Justices in Misco, by virtue of their
express instruction that the public policy exception is narrow, counseled
71 Baton Rouge Oil & Chen. Workers Union, 77 F.3d at 851.
72 Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union, 991 F.2d at 247; Baton Rouge Oil & Chem.
Workers Union, 77 F.3d at 851.
73 Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union, 991 F.2d at 247-48.
74 Id. at 250-52 (discussing the Drug Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C.
§§ 701-707 (1994 & Supp. 2000); the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213; Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (Sept. 17, 1986)
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1994 & Supp. 2000); as well as various other Federal
regulations and judicial opinions pertaining to drug use in the workplace).
75 Id. at 254-55.
7 6 Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union, 77 F.3d at 853 (upholding employees'
discharge under these circumstances would have amounted to discipline without prior
notice of the consequences of employees' actions).
7 7 Id. at 856.
78 Id. at'853.
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judicial decision makers to avoid policy based decisions overreaching into
arbitration because parties' have agreed to arbitration as the exclusive means
for resolving their contractual disputes.
Assuming, as the Fifth Circuit did, that other employees will be
encouraged to use drugs because one who did so received back pay when he
was improperly discharged, seems like an attenuated basis for furthering the
public policy of a drug free workplace. Since this relationship is indirect, it
should be insufficient to overcome the traditional judicial deference to
arbitration required to vacate these awards, despite the fact that both
employees had safety sensitive jobs.79 The broad approach of the Fifth
Circuit in these decisions, while not expressly overruled by Eastern
Associated Coal, is now suspect.
A drug free workplace is of paramount concern to employers, employees,
and society as a whole, whether safety is implicated or not. Still, Eastern
Associated Coal counsels that indirect safety concerns do not justify
significantly broader interpretations of public policy than were intended by
the Supreme Court in Misco.80 As such, a job performance test with respect
to drug use and workplace safety seems preferable under Misco for assessing
arbitration decisions raising public policy considerations.
One federal circuit court has already applied such a test. In Monroe Auto
Equipment Co. v. UAW, Local 1878,81 the Sixth Circuit refused to vacate an
award reinstating a mechanic who worked on test cars at an auto plant who
had been discharged for drug use. Despite the fact that the mechanic had
failed a drug test and was in violation of an express company policy,
according to the court his reinstatement did not violate any public policy
because there was insufficient showing that his work performance was
impaired. 82
Under this approach, absent a showing that the employee's work was, or
is, likely to be impaired in a manner prohibited by public policy, there is
nothing compelling a court to reject judicial deference and vacate an award
79 It seems unlikely that an employee would be encouraged to use drugs because a
coworker was reinstated following discipline that lacked just cause. Assuming some
causal relationship between the drug use and the award of back pay as the Fifth Circuit
did in Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union seems like the type of judicial refusal,
based on speculation, to enforce awards that Misco specifically proscribed. See United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 44-45 (1987).
80 The Justices in Eastern Associated Coal noted in their particular statutory scheme
governing U.S. Department of Transportation licensed commercial drivers, employee
rehabilitation following drug use was as prominently emphasized as preventing accidents
through additional testing. E. Associated Coal Corp. v. UMWA, Dist. 17, 121 S.Ct. 462,
468 (2000).
81 Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. UAW, Local 1878, 981 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992).
82 Id. at 269.
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under the public policy exception. The public policy exception is rooted in
the common law doctrine that contracts which violate law or policy should
not be enforced; therefore, only where enforcement of the award materially
impairs public policy in a way proscribed by that policy, should deference to
arbitrators' authority be withdrawn. This approach seems most consistent
with Misco. 83
Some cases in which employers seek to vacate awards reinstating their
employees involve safety and public policy, but not drug use. In Stead
Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173,84 an auto dealer
terminated a mechanic who, on more than one occasion, while repairing cars
failed to properly re-secure lug nuts holding the wheels. The arbitrator agreed
with the employer that the mechanic's conduct amounted to "reckless"
behavior, but decreased the penalty from termination to a lengthy
suspension.85 The employer sought vacatur of the award with the argument
that it violated a state public policy requiring safe maintenance of
automobiles, and both the district court and a three judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit agreed that such a policy existed and was violated by this conduct.86
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed. It reasoned that arbitrators
are entitled to "nearly unparalleled" deference by virtue of their unique role
as non-judicial decision makers for the parties to a contract. 87 As such, the
judges concluded from their reading of Misco that courts must find that
overriding public policy bars the relief ordered by the arbitrator in order to
vacate the award.88 Finding no instruction in the public policy of California
relating to automobile safety or maintenance that auto mechanics who
discharged their duties recklessly must be discharged, the plurality opinion
83 Id.; see also Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1024 (10th Cir.
1993) (rejecting the "broad" and "narrow" descriptions of public policy tests used by
various courts as unhelpful in interpreting Misco's demand that courts look for "explicit
conflicts" between public policy and awards).
84 Stead Motors v. Auto. Machinists Lodge No. 1173,886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989)
(en banc).
85 Id. at 1203.
86 Id. at 1204 (discussing the circuit court panel decision at 843 F.2d 357 (9th Cir.
1988)).
87 Id. at 1205-06.
What courts do when they review an arbitrator's award is more akin to the review of
a contract than of the decision of an inferior tribunal: the award, just as a contract, is
the expression of the parties' will and must be enforced as expressed unless illegal
or otherwise void. Judicial "reinterpretation"... is ordinarily an invalid exercise of
our power.
Id.
88 Id. at 1212. ("If a court relies on public policy to vacate an arbitral award
reinstating an employee, it must be a policy that bars reinstatement.").
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concluded it had no basis to overrule the arbitrator's judgment that
termination was unwarranted. 89
Two separate dissenting opinions, joined by a total of six judges were
filed in Stead Motors. The first one favored vacatur and criticized the
majority for not giving more consideration to state public policy mandating
road safety, as well as to the dangers created by the discharged employee's
conduct.90
The second dissenting opinion agreed that the award did not conflict with
any explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy by reinstating the
mechanic. 91 However, these judges disagreed with the plurality view that
Misco requires a court to defer to an arbitrator's findings as to the
effectiveness of the proposed discipline, as well as to an arbitrator's findings
relating to the subject matter of the underlying dispute.92 This position is
suspect, though, in light of Eastern Associated Coal. The Justices indicated
that under federal labor law, policy questions about the appropriateness of
discipline are best resolved in arbitration, not courts. 93
This second dissent also criticized the way the plurality explained a
court's authority to engage in public policy review, which seemed to give
arbitrators the power to address questions of public policy that Misco
intended for the courts to decide.94 Ultimately, a clear majority of the judges
in Stead Motors agreed that public policy was not violated by reinstating the
mechanic, provided he received some discipline to correct his reckless
behavior, because no public policy expressly forbade the reinstatement of an
employee who had endangered others by his conduct.95
The narrow view, taken by the Ninth Circuit in Stead Motors, of court
authority to review awards under the public policy exception makes vacatur
of arbitration decisions in that circuit very unlikely. Under this interpretation,
legislatures seemingly need to authorize guidelines for implementing
statutory policy goals that specify all the harms they wish to prevent as well
as any conceivable penalties they may wish to impose in order for parties to
successfully cite these policies to challenge a contrary award. This narrow
89 Id. at 1216-17.
90 Id. at 1219, 1224. (Trott, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 1225. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 1225-26.
93 In Eastern Associated Coal, the Justices noted that when courts evaluate public
policy challenges they must examine the "relevant statutory and regulatory
provisions.., in light of background labor law policy that favors determination of
disciplinary questions through arbitration ... ." E. Associated Coal Corp. v. UM1WA,
Dist. 17, 121 S. Ct. 462, 468 (2000).
94 Stead Motors, 886 F.2d at 1227.
95 Id. at 1217, 1225.
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approach does not allow for the possibility that public policy might be
explicit, dominant, and well-defined by looking at the totality of law in an
area, even if a specific circumstance is not literally stated in a particular rule
or regulation. Though the public policy exception was meant to be narrow,
this approach seems too deferential.
The justices in Misco clearly intended some, albeit narrow, public policy
review.96 Under the Ninth Circuit approach even the most glaring disparity
between an arbitrator's decision as to an employee's discipline and his actual
conduct could not be challenged as violating public policy absent some
express proscription against the terms of an arbitrator's award. This raises a
virtually insurmountable barrier to challenges based on the public policy
exception and ignores the potential danger to the public or to those in the
workplace potentially created by an individual's continued employment. 97
V. TRANSPORTATION SAFETY AND PUBLIC POLICY
Many courts try to uniformly apply the safety sensitive employment
cases invoking the public policy exception. Most of these cases are, however,
distinguishable in terms of the nature of the risks involved and the
appropriate regulatory scheme. One series of decisions involves employers
seeking vacatur of awards reinstating employees to jobs involving
transportation of passengers or hazardous materials. Many of these cases,
like the ones dealing with workplace safety, involve drug or alcohol abuse by
the discharged employee.
A key factor distinguishing cases involving transportation employees
from cases involving employees in power plants or refineries is that with
transportation employees there are few, if any, backup safety systems for
containing the risks to the general public or the environment following an
accident. Consequently, the direct risks associated with an employee's
misconduct in this context are arguably greater in scope and immediacy,
except of course in the event of an uncontrolled nuclear or chemical accident.
96 United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1987).
97 See, e.g., Dyno Nobel, Inc., v. United Steelworkers, 77 F. Supp. 2d 307, 309-10
(N.D.N.Y. 1999). In this case the court refused to vacate an award reinstating an
explosives plant employee who committed "reckless" acts on more than one occasion.
The employer cited New York State regulations governing workplace safety in plants
manufacturing explosives, as well as federal regulations issued by OSHA, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and the U.S. Department of Transportation, in arguing
that read together these provisions constituted clear, well-defined, and dominant public
policy against the reinstatement of this employee to his former position. The court,
following the Niagara Mohawk cases and Stead Motors, found no policy expressly
forbade reinstatement and refused to vacate the award, which it deemed "regrettable." Id.
at 309-10.
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Since transportation is a heavily regulated industry, parties' seeking vacatur
can point to many sources of public policy when challenging the terms of an
award. For these reasons several courts have taken broad views of their roles
in applying the public policy exception to this area.
For example, three cases in the Third Circuit involving Exxon employees
engaged in transportation of hazardous materials all held that it is a violation
of public policy to reinstate such employees after they were found to have
abused drugs or alcohol on the job.98 In the first case, Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Exxon Seamen's Union (Exxon 1),9 the Third Circuit found that broad public
policy exists forbidding individuals from working in the operation of
common carriers in any capacity, while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs. 100
The employee in this case was a helmsman who failed a drug test after
his oil tanker ran aground. 10 1 The circuit court defined the appropriate
question under Misco as determining whether the award was inconsistent
with some express, well-defined, and significant public policy, adopting what
it deemed as a broad approach to public policy review. 102 The court
concluded that reinstating the employee would be contrary to public policy,
sirce it would "thwart achievement of the overriding interest in public safety
furthered by [it].' I0 3
In the second case, also captioned Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon
Seamen's Union (Exxon 11),'04 the Third Circuit closely followed its previous
98 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union (Exxon 1), 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir.
1993); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union (Exxon I1), 11 F.3d 1189 (3d Cir.
1993); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union (Exxon I1), 73 F.3d 1287 (3d Cir.
1996).
99 Exxon 1, 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
100 Id. at 360-62. The employer cited various Coast Guard regulations which stated
that individuals who failed drug tests could not be employed in "duties which directly
affect the safe operation of the vessel" and such individuals could not be returned to work
until "drug free and the risk of subsequent use of dangerous drugs by that person is
sufficiently low to justify his or her return to work." (quoting Required Chemical Testing,
46 C.F.R. § 16.201(c) (2000) and Standards for Chemical Testing for Dangerous Drugs,
46 C.F.R. § 16.370(d) (2000)). The employer also cited similar regulations applied by
other transportation agencies, including the Federal Aviation Administration Drug
Testing Program, 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 at App. 1 (2000), the Federal Railroad Administration
Control of Alcohol and Drug Use, 49 C.F.R. pt. 219 (1999), and the Federal Highway
Administration Controlled Substances and Alcohol Use and Testing, 49 C.F.R. pt. 382
(1999).
101 Id. at 358.
102 Id. at 363.
103 Id. at 364.
104 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union (Exxon I/), 11 F.3d 1189 (3d Cir.
1993)
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decision. Here a seaman working aboard another oil tanker reported for work
while intoxicated and was discharged. 10 5 The award reinstating him was
vacated and the Third Circuit, citing the same policies as in Exxon I,
affirmed. 106 The judges repeated their concerns about creating danger to the
public by allowing physically unfit individuals to perform duties aboard
maritime vessels, noting the general public as well as the employer should
not have to risk more accidents.107 While acknowledging that courts must
show significant deference to arbitration decisions, the Third Circuit
reasoned that the potential danger created by enforcement of the award
justified invoking the public policy exception and vacating the award.108
Finally, the last case in the Exxon trilogy, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon
Seamen's Union (Exxon i1L),109 involved the discharge of an oil tanker pump
worker who refused to take a drug test. 110 Unlike the employees in the
previous cases his duties did not involve navigation or operation of the vessel
itself but rather loading and unloading its cargo, although his position was
still deemed safety sensitive. 111 The employer discovered drugs in his room
during a random search and ordered him to take a drug test, but he refused
and was discharged. It was unclear whether the drugs in the room actually
belonged to him, so he was reinstated by the arbitration panel reviewing his
discharge, but he was still disciplined for insubordination in refusing to take
the test. 112
In Exxon III the Third Circuit reaffirmed its earlier holdings that a court
engaging in public policy review under Misco can vacate an award that is
inconsistent with the express, well-defined, and dominant public policy of
preventing employment of drug users in the operation of common carriers. 113
105 l at 1191.
106 Id. at 1194-96.
107 Id. at 1195-96.
108 Id. at 1196.
109 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union (Exxon 111), 73 F.3d 1287 (3d
Cir. 1996).
110 Id. at 1289-90.
111 Id. at 1289.
112 Id. at 1290-91. The arbitrator noted that the employee should have obeyed and
then filed a grievance.
113 Id. at 1292-93. The reasoning of the Third Circuit in the Exxon trilogy was
closely followed by the First Circuit in a case involving another Exxon employee who
was discharged from his job as the driver/loader of a tractor trailer carrying gasoline after
he failed a drug test. Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, Inc., 118 F.3d 841, 847-49
(lst Cir. 1997). For another example of a case articulating the public policy against
employment of persons who abuse drugs or alcohol in the operation of surface
transportation, see Union Pac. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 3 F.3d 255, 262 (8th Cir.
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However, the court here affirmed the lower court decision that his
reinstatement was proper because the arbitrator had determined insufficient
cause existed in the first place to justify the drug test under the collective
bargaining agreement, and such a determination was not a basis for public
policy vacatur.1 14 The judges agreed his refusal to take a drug test was
insubordination and indicated that they would have reached a different result
on the public policy question had there been reasonable cause for the test.1 15
They also expressly declared that reinstatement of employees to safety
sensitive positions, who refuse to take drug tests in situations where
reasonable cause exists for drug testing, would violate public policy. 1 16
As with the Fifth Circuit cases discussed earlier, the Third Circuit's
broad approach to public policy review is now suspect in light of Eastern
Associated Coal. However, given that statutory and regulatory schemes differ
on a case by case basis, and that statutes and regulations constantly change, it
cannot be said that Eastern Associated Coal entirely forecloses public policy
vacatur of any award involving transportation employees.
In Eastern Associated Coal, the Justices examined a broad regulatory
scheme issued under the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of
1991.117 In determining that the reinstatement of a commercial truck driver
following a second positive test was not prohibited by these regulations, the
court reviewed the regulations concerning suspension of commercial
licenses, as well as rehabilitation and follow up testing. It seems likely that
public policy would have been violated by an award reinstating the driver
without assurance that the rehabilitation and follow up testing guidelines
required by DOT regulations were met, or if the award compelled Eastern to
return the driver to safety sensitive employment prior to completing
treatment. But since the award imposed severe discipline, mandated
1993) (vacating the reinstatement of a railroad brakeman who failed a drug test
administered following an accident).
114 Exxon III, 73 F.3d at 1295.
115 Id. at 1294.
116 Id. at 1294-95. The court went so far as to state that a contraly result would
"radically undermine" its holdings in Exxon I and II. Despite this pronouncement from the
Third Circuit, it is not always clear that an award reinstating an employee who refused to
take a drug test based on reasonable cause would violate public policy. See Trinity Indus.
v. United Steelworkers, 891 F. Supp. 342, 348-49 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that where
an arbitrator reinstates employees who refused to submit to drug tests based on reasonable
cause, public policy is not violated where the arbitrator found the employees' due process
rights were violated because they were not informed of the evidence placing them under
suspicion).
117 49 U.S.C. § 31306 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
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rehabilitation prior to reinstatement and continued testing, and imposed a last
chance agreement, it was consistent with the regulations. 118
Courts have generally recognized that public policy requires anyone
entrusted with the lives and safety of the traveling public to fulfill their duties
in a safe manner.1 19 Such a view is further exhibited by a public policy case
involving an airline pilot who was discharged for flying while intoxicated. In
Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n International,120 the employer
sought to vacate, an award ordering a pilot's reinstatement, as well as
payment of the discharged pilot's alcohol rehabilitation costs by the airline.
This pilot drank heavily the night before an early morning flight and
appeared intoxicated to the crew when reporting for flight duty. 121
Nevertheless, he piloted a full aircraft without incident. Upon reaching the
plane's destination he was reported for flying while intoxicated and given a
blood alcohol test, which he failed. He was discharged one week later.122
The System Board hearing grievances under the applicable collective
bargaining agreement ruled in a divided opinion that just cause did not exist
for discharge because the pilot was not offered the chance to receive any
rehabilitation counseling, which was generally offered by the airline to
employees who abused alcohol.123 The panel ordered reinstatement without
back pay, but also awarded the discharged pilot the costs of his participation
in a separate rehabilitation program. 124 The employer subsequently appealed
the award. 125
The district court vacated this award on the grounds that ordering
reinstatement of this pilot would violate the well-defined and dominant
public policy against allowing intoxicated pilots to operate aircrafts. 126 In
affirming this result, the Eleventh Circuit defined its inquiry under Misco in
terms of whether an award conflicts with well-defined and dominant public
118 E. Associated Coal Corp. v. UMWA, Dist. 17, 121 S. Ct. 462, 468-69 (2000).
119 NLRB v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 128 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1942) (refusing
on public policy grounds to enforce an NLRB reinstatement order for a bus driver who
was terminated for driving while intoxicated).
120 Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 666 (11th Cir.
1988).
121 Id. at 667. The crew later testified that he appeared disoriented and that his
breath smelled of liquor.
12 2 Id. at 667-68.
123 Id. at 668.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 669. Delta's Flight Operations Procedures Manual states that the "[u]se of
intoxicating beverages ... within 24 hours prior to departure of a flight is prohibited." Id.
at 668.
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policy as it relates to an employee's conduct which is "integral to the
performance of employment duties."127 The court next recognized that
federal aviation regulations, as well as forty state statutes forbidding the
operation of airplanes while intoxicated, constituted explicit, well defined
and dominant public policy against this pilot's conduct, satisfying the first
element of public policy review. 128
The judges went on to conclude that the pilot had violated public policy
in the performance of his duties and as such his reinstatement violated the
dominant public policy prohibiting his conduct. 129 It characterized his
improper conduct as "inextricably related" to the performance of his job,
which in the court's view compelled vacatur on public policy grounds. 130
However, despite this pronouncement by the Eleventh Circuit that awards
reinstating pilots who flew while intoxicated violated well-defined and
dominant public policy, other courts have refused to vacate similar awards on
these grounds. 131
Overall, myriad. jurisprudence has developed addressing public policy
review of arbitration awards that implicate safety concerns. These cases
indicate that several federal circuit courts take broad views of their power to
vacate awards on public policy grounds when safety is potentially at risk,
whether from employee substance abuse or willful disregard for safety
protocols. While such broad analysis seems suspect following Eastern
127 Id. at 671. The Eleventh Circuit also stated that Misco required courts to
determine whether there was "an established public policy condemn[ing] the
performance of employment activities in the manner engaged in by the employee."
Id. This seems similar to the approach taken by the Sixth Circuit in Monroe Auto
Equipment, which refused to vacate an award reinstating an employee whose drug
abuse was not shown to have affected nor was likely to so impair his job
performance that public policy compelled his.discharge. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v.
UAW, Local 1878, 981 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992).
128 Delta Airlines, 861 F. 2d at 672-74.
129 Id. at 674.
130 Id. Here again a court seems to be applying a job performance impairment model
for Misco public policy analysis when comparing an award to the relevant positive law.
131 See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Assoc'n Int'l, 808 F.2d 76, 83
(D.C. Cir. 1987). In this case, decided prior to Misco but still part of the common law of
the District of Columbia Circuit, the court reversed a district court's finding that
reinstatement of a pilot who operated an airplane within 24 hours after consuming
alcohol violated public policy. The court reasoned that no public policy forbade
conditional reinstatement of this pilot following his completion of an alcohol treatment
program and re-certification by the FAA as being fit to fly, both specific terms of the
awhrd issued by the System Board of Adjustment hearing his grievance. Id. Here the D.C.
Circuit took a narrow view of its power to review awards for public policy violations
under pre-Misco jurisprudence such as W.R. Grace, which it has continued to apply since
Misco.
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Associated Coal, it is not prohibited and a court's decision will depend
principally on the scope of the positive law at issue. The public policy
exception is narrow, but various courts have demonstrated their willingness
to reject traditional court deference to arbitration when concerned about
transportation safety.
VI. DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE GENERALLY
The public policy cases dealing with employees in safety sensitive jobs
involving drug or alcohol abuse demonstrate how reluctantly some courts
uphold awards reinstating drug users. When these employees work in safety
sensitive areas there is an increased likelihood that their conduct will
endanger themselves, their co-workers, or the general public. Consequently,
several courts have taken a broad view of judicial authority to vacate awards
on public policy grounds that reinstate drug abusers to safety sensitive jobs.
However, where safety concerns are not directly implicated courts have
frequently refused to vacate awards on the grounds that reinstating drug users
violates general public policy i- favor of eliminating drug use in the
workplace. While such policy is arguably as important as maintaining safety
in hazardous work facilities and in transportation, where safety is not directly
implicated, the scope of judicial authority under the public policy exception
to vacate awards reinstating drug users seems narrower since fewer sources
of positive law bar restatement.
In Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. Service Employees International Union
Dist.1199,132 the Second Circuit upheld an award reinstating an employee
who was discharged for possession of and intent to distribute marijuana. The
employee had been arrested following an argument with a co-worker that led
to a minor assault. 133 During a search of the employee the police found
marijuana and drug paraphernalia.134 He was charged with possession of
marijuana with intent to sell it as well as assault in the third degree. 135 He
was subsequently discharged for fighting and for possessing marijuana on the
job. 136
132 Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. SEIU Dist.1199, 116 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1997).
133 Id. at 42.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 42-43. The police discovered "three-quarters of an ounce of marijuana,
several empty plastic bags, plastic tweezers, and a small scale." Id. at 42. Eventually all
the charges were reduced to one count of possession of marijuana. He was placed in a
rehabilitation program for a probationary period, the successful completion of which
would result in dismissal of the charges and the clearing of his criminal record. Id. at 43.
136 Id. at 43.
319
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The arbitrator hearing the employee's grievance contesting this penalty
found no just cause existed for discharging the employee for either the
assault or the drug possession, reasoning that the employee had no other
major disciplinary problems over his long employment history and there was
no evidence that the employee was actually dealing drugs. 137 The employer
then challenged this award as to the drug charges as a violation of the "'well
defined and dominant public policy against possession, sale and distribution
of illegal drugs, a public policy that is even more important in the
workplace.'"1 38
The Second Circuit acknowledged that strong public policy exists against
the use and sale of illegal drugs, citing various statutes and regulations
offered by the employer.139 However, the court determined that nothing
supported the position that public policy would be violated by simply
suspending, rather than dismissing, this employee. 140 In distinguishing
several of the safety sensitive employment cases where awards reinstating
drug users were vacated, the court noted that the public policy forbidding
reinstatement in those instances was more explicit and did not directly
pertain to employees in the health care field. 141
The Second Circuit's decision in Saint Mary Home demonstrates how
courts engaging in public policy review of awards must be persuaded that an
arbitrator's treatment of the offending conduct at issue in applying the
language of the parties' contract creates sufficient conflict with well-defined
and dominant public policy to overcome judicial deference to arbitration. It is
insufficient that illegal conduct like drug use is contrary to public policy; in
order for the award to violate public policy its express terms, an
interpretation of the parties' contract, must be contrary to the policy as
137 Id. The arbitrator, reviewing all the evidence, did find just cause for a seven
month suspension.
138 Id. at 45 (quoting Appellant's brief).
139 Id. at 46. Some of this authority included materials cited in safety sensitive
employment cases, such as the Drug Free Workplace Act of 1998, 41 U.S.C. § 701
(Supp. IV 1998).
140 Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 46.
Nowhere does the [employer] point to an established policy that calls for a
fixed disciplinary action of permanent dismissal in all cases where drug related
conduct occurs in the workplace. Rather, it appears that the public policy relating to
the response for drug related conduct in the workplace is flexible and remedial.
Id.
141 Id. at 46-47. The court noted that in many safety sensitive employment cases the
discharged employees created life threatening risks by abusing drugs while on the job,
and indicated that comparable public policy scrutiny would be appropriate for health care
employees with similar responsibilities, such as doctors, nurses, or emergency medical
technicians. Id.
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well.142 As such, absent a clear regulatory prohibition on reinstating drug
users, it is difficult to demonstrate that reinstatement of a drug user is
contrary to clear, well-defined and dominant public policy.
This narrow public policy review of awards reinstating drug users to non
safety-sensitive jobs is not limited to the Second Circuit. The Eighth Circuit
addressed this subject in Alvey, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688.143 In
this case police received an anonymous tip that Dewey Bounds, an employee
at the company plant, was dealing drugs. 144 Bounds was stopped after
leaving the plant and a search of a bag in his car turned up drug paraphernalia
and traces of cocaine. 145
Bounds was eventually found guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia
and given two years probation. 146 The company discharged him but an
arbitrator ruled that no just cause existed for dismissal and ordered him
reinstated with full back pay. 147 The employer sought to vacate the award on
various grounds, including that it violated well-defined and dominant public
policy against illegal drugs in the workplace. 148 The Eighth Circuit, like the
Second Circuit, acknowledged the existence of this public policy but
142 Id. at 47. The Second Circuit revisited these issues when reviewing the
reinstatement of an employee who came to work under the influence of prescription
drugs and alcohol in First Nat'l Supermarkets, Inc. v. Retail, Wholesale & Chain Store
Food Employees Union Local 338, 118 F.3d 892 (2d Cir. 1997). Here the employee, a
store manager, arrived for work impaired by prescription drugs and alcohol, as evinced
by his shouting and disorientation during his shift. Id. at 894. At a hearing he admitted to
taking a combination of prescription drugs and also admitted that he brought a weapon
onto company property. Id. Following his discharge, an arbitrator reinstated him,
reducing his termination to a suspension. Id. at 895. The arbitrator reasoned that although
the employee's misconduct violated company rules this did not necessarily constitute just
cause for dismissal because there was no indication that he had consumed alcohol while
on the job so as to require his automatic termination. Id. The Second Circuit rejected an
appeal on public policy grounds. id. at 897-98 (citing Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d 41).
143 Alvey, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, 132 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1997).
144 Id. at 1210.
145 Id.
14 6 Id. at 1210. This occurred prior to the arbitration hearing for his grievance.
147 Id. at 1211. At his hearing the criminal court decision was placed into evidence
and police officers testified that following his arrest Bounds admitted the drug
paraphernalia was his, but Bounds testified in the hearing that he had never seen it and
that somebody could have planted it on him. The arbitrator ruled that because of this
uncertainty as to the origin of the drug paraphernalia there was no just cause for dismissal
or even discipline. Id.
14 8 Id. at 1212. The district court granted summary judgment to the union, but the
circuit court reversed, ruling that the "award did not draw its essence from" the collective
bargaining agreement allowing employees to be discharged for drug offenses because the
arbitrator had too narrowly construed the term "possession" in the contractual work rules.
Id. at 1213.
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reasoned that, based on the arbitrator's interpretation of the facts, there was
no basis for finding a clear violation of any aspects of the policy. 149
Illegal drug use in any workplace, regardless of whether an employee
holds a safety-sensitive job, is a serious concern. Employee drug abuse
creating danger to others in the workplace is contrary to well-defined and
dominant public policy under Misco. 150 The public policy against drug use in
society in general has been widely articulated, but absent a showing that an
employee's drug use creates safety concerns it is very unlikely that an award
reinstating that employee will violate public policy. 15 1 This general
opposition to drug use in the workplace, no matter how widely articulated,
has been insufficient to vacate awards reinstating employees who abused
drugs but created no safety hazards. 152
VII. SEXUAL HARASSMENT PREVENTION AND
PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW
Sexual harassment cases present a broad range of policy issues that may
be violated in arbitration awards. Since the Supreme Court ruled that Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sexual harassment in the
149 Id. at 1212. For another case in which the Eighth Circuit addressed an
arbitrator's reduction of discipline for an employee found to have violated company drug
policy, see Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 878 v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 84 F.3d
299 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that an arbitrator's holding to discharge an employee who
failed a drug test, but was granted back pay from the time of discharge until the date the
hearing began because of company procedural delays during preparation for the hearing,
did not violate well-defined and dbminant public policy against illegal drug use in the
workplace).
15 0 See Pepsi Cola-Albany Bottling Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 669, No.
96-CV-1986, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8760, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. June 10, 1998) ("Clearly
there exists a public policy aimed at preventing employees from performing safety-
sensitive jobs while under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol.").
151 In addition to the aforementioned decisions in the Second and Eighth Circuit, for
other examples see Container Corp. of Am. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local
208, No. CV-93-5773 SVW, 1994 WL 803270, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1994) (ruling
that the reinstatement of an employee who possessed marijuana on company premises did
not violate public policy); Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Becker, 195 F.3d 1201 (10th
Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court's decision to refuse to vacate on public policy
grounds an award reinstating a truck driver who failed a drug test where the arbitrator read
the contract as requiring evidence of on the job impairment for disciplinary action, despite
Utah law allowing employers to conduct general drug tests and use the results as a basis
for disciplinary action).
152 Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Becker, 195 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 1999); see
also Bernard F. Ashe, Arbitration Finality and the Public Policy, DiSP. RESOL. J., Sept.
1994, at 22.
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workplace, there is no question that such conduct need not be tolerated by an
individual's coworkers or employer. 53 The public policy against sexual
harassment in the workplace has expanded through statutes, regulations, and
common law in order to address the pervasive harm stemming from it, and
arbitrators reviewing cases involving sexual harassment risk violating this
large body of public policy. This risk is clear because certain courts have not
hesitated to vacate awards when it is determined that reinstating a sexual
harasser undermines well-defined and dominant public policy against sexual
harassment in the workplace.' 54
For instance, in Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, No.
915,155 the Second Circuit affirmed a district court decision vacating an
award which reinstated a repeat sexual harasser. On a prior occasion this
employee had been disciplined for disorderly conduct, which was
characterized by that arbitrator as "'offensive and unauthorized contact'
with certain female employees. 156 Though in a prior case a different
arbitrator reinstated the grievant, that arbitrator suggested any subsequent
improper conduct of a similar nature would be sufficient grounds for
immediate discharge. 157
Still, following another incident the employee was again discharged for
sexual harassment of female coworkers. 158 This time another arbitrator also
found the employee guilty of repeated episodes of physical sexual
harassment but instead of following the previous award the arbitrator gave
the employee one final chance to save his job.1 59
153 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) ("[A] plaintiff may
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created
a hostile or abusive work environment.").
154 For analyses of public policy review of sexual harassment cases in the context of
labor arbitration, as well as problems arbitrators are often faced with in this area, see
Douglas E. Ray, Sexual Harassment, Labor Arbitration and National Labor Policy, 73
NEB. L. REv. 812, 825-29 (1994); see also Tim Bornstein, Arbitration of Sexual
Harassment, in ARBITRATION 1991: THE CHANGING FACE OF ARBITRATION IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 109 (Gladys W. Gruenberg, ed. 1991).
155 Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir.
1990).
156 Id. at 842.
157 Id. ("Any action on the part of [the grievant] which is consistent with this pasi
citable behavior shall be grounds for immediate discharge and he will not be given the
benefit of the doubt or shown any leniency.").
158 Id. On this occasion the employee was charged with "brushing up" against female
coworkers as well as placing his hands on them. These events occurred at least three times
following his reinstatement.
159 Id. at 843. The arbitrator acknowledged the earlier decision but found that
immediate discharge was not warranted at that time, ruling that "any similar offensive
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A district court vacated this award, finding it contrary to clear public
policy against sexual harassment in the workplace. 160 The Second Circuit
agreed, holding that reinstatement of an employee who was already on notice
that further acts of sexual harassment would result in discharge, and yet
repeated his misconduct anyway, effectively undermined the public policy
against sexual harassment in the workplace. 161
Newsday seems like a clear case for vacatur on public policy grounds
based on the strength of the policy to prevent sexual harassment in the
workplace, the repeated conduct of the employee, and the failure of the
second arbitrator to enforce the warning issued by the first one that this
employee faced discharge for any repeat offense.162 Still, given that the
Second Circuit takes a narrow view of judicial review under the public policy
exception, 163 it is unlikely that this court or most other federal circuit courts
would vacate the reinstatement of an employee found to have committed a
single act of sexual harassment.
Other circuit courts have already taken the position that where an
arbitrator determines an employee undisputedly committed a single act of
sexual harassment but could still be rehabilitated, ordering reinstatement
following a suspension would not violate public policy. 164 Further,
reinstatement of an employee who admitted to a pattern of harassing conduct
would also not necessarily violate public policy. 165
behavior" should result in discharge. In effect his award was another "last chance" for the
employee.16 0 Id. The district court ruled that reinstatement of a "chronic" sexual harasser
would "permit his sexual harassment to threaten to perpetuate a hostile, intimidating and
offensive work environment."
161 Id. at 845. The court also noted that reinstatement of this employee would
impede the employer's ability to prevent sexual harassment in its workplace, an
important consideration given the vicarious liability employers face under Title VII for
the actions of their employees.
162 Unlike the arbitrator here, many arbitrators don't give repeat employee sexual
harassment offenders a second chance. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 103 LA 248 (1994). In
fact, when a grievant is reinstated under a binding "last-chance" agreement any violation
usually results in termination. ABTCO Inc., 104 LA 551 (1995).
163 IBEW, Local 97 v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Niagara 1), 143 F.3d 704 (2d
Cir. 1998).
164 Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Int'l Union, 959 F.2d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 1992);
Communication Workers v. S.E. Elec. Coop., 882 F.2d 467, 469 (10th Cir. 1989).
165 Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 171 F.3d 971, 977 (4th Cir.
1999) (reversing the vacatur of an award reinstating an admitted sex harasser being
disciplined for the first time, noting that "[t]here is no public policy that every harasser
must be fired.").
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However, in Stroehmann Bakeries Inc. v. Local 776, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,166 the Third Circuit determined that an arbitrator
had violated public policy by reinstating an employee without making any
factual finding as to the merits of his discharge for a single incident of sexual
harassment. In this case the employee, a delivery truck driver, was
discharged after a complaint by a store employee who alleged that the driver
had grabbed at her and made sexually explicit remarks during a delivery to
her store. 167 An arbitrator reviewing the driver's grievance ruled that
discharge was inappropriate because the employer had insufficiently
investigated the alleged incident of sexual harassment before acting against
the employee. 168 A district court then vacated this award as contrary to
explicit, well-defined, and dominant "public policy against sexual
harassment in the workplace."'169
The Third Circuit affirmed the. district court, holding that reinstatement
violated the well-defined and dominant public policy against sexual
harassment in the workplace because it "would allow a person who may have
committed sexual harassment to continue in the workplace."'170 In reaching
this conclusion the court dismissed the notion that the public policy against
sexual harassment in the workplace had not been violated by an award
reinstating a sex harasser based on concerns for industrial due process,
namely the employer's failure in the view of the arbitrator to adequately
substantiate the charges. 171 In the court's view the failure of the arbitrator to
consider the merits of the charges of sexual harassment against the grievant
before ordering his reinstatement was deemed sufficiently contrary to the
1.66 Stroehmann Bakeries Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436
(3d Cir. 1992).
167 Id. at 1438.
168 Id. at 1440, 1448. The arbitrator ruled that there was no just cause for
discharging the employee because the employer had taken this action before adequately
investigating the charges of sexual harassment, not because the evidence demonstrated
that the grievant was innocent of the charge. Id. at 1440. Indeed in his opinion the
arbitrator noted that it was the failure of the employer to present sufficient evidence
substantiating the charge of sexual harassment, as opposed to a lack of severity in the
alleged misconduct, which required his refusal to uphold the employee's discharge. Id. at
1448.
169 Id. at 1440.
170 Id. at 1442. In the court's view such a result would also undermine an
employer's statutory obligation under Title VII to prevent the occurrence of sexual
harassment in its workplace. Id.
171 Id. at 1444-445. The majority opinion noted that even if there had been a
violation of industrial due process in the course of the investigation and subsequent
grievance proceedings, such failures by the employer could not "override all other public
policy concerns." Id. at 1445 n.7. The court added that in its view "a labor arbitrator's
concept of industrial due process does not override a definitive public policy." Id.
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well-defined and dominant public policy against sexual harassment as to
require vacatur. 172
Prevention of sexual harassment is unquestionably a well-defined and
dominant public policy for the purposes of Misco public policy review. Still,
its application under the public policy exception to overturn reinstatement of
sex harassers has produced mixed results despite the serious harms sexual
harassment creates in the workplace. Though this conduct is offensive in any
context and contrary to widespread public policy, perhaps since it does not
create the same levels of physical danger to public health and safety as
reinstatement of employees to safety sensitive jobs, the reinstatement of a sex
harasser is less likely to be vacated on public policy grounds. 173
VIII. VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE
Violence at work is prevalent today. 174 Employers have an obligation to
prpvide safe working environments for their employees, and many argue that
they should not be compelled to tolerate physical assaults by employees
against co-workers, supervisors, or others in their places of business that
would not be tolerated in society at large.175 Still, strict judicial deference to
172 Id. at 1442. One district court has also held that an arbitrator violated public
policy by reinstating an employee discharged for sexual harassment because of
procedural failures by the employer in taking the disciplinary action without considering
the merits of the underlying sexual harassment charge. United Transp. Union v.
Burlington N. R.R., 864 F. Supp. 138 (D. Or. 1994). However, another court rejected a
public policy challenge to an arbitrator's finding of no just cause for the discharge of a
sexual harasser on the grounds that it would amount to "disparate treatment" of the
grievant, even though the factual circumstances indicated sexual harassing conduct had
occurred. Communication Workers of Am. v. Bell Atlantic-W. Va., 27 F. Supp. 2d 66
(D.D.C. 1998).
173 The Seventh Circuit drew this distinction in a footnote to Chrysler Motors Corp.
v. International Union, distinguishing its case from safety sensitive cases where the
employees engaged in conduct rendering them unfit to perform duties "integral to their
employment" in ways which "jeopardized public health or safety." 959 F.2d 685, 689 n.3
(7th Cir. 1992). See also the reasoning by the Fourth Circuit in Westvaco Corp. v. United
Paperworkers International Union, 171 F.3d 971, 977 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999), which stated,
"We do not have before us conduct that compromises the performance of a safety-
sensftive job."
174 According to one article, "over two million people are physically attacked in the
workplace annually and another six million are threatened with violence while at work."
Margaret A. Lucero & Robert E. Allen, Fighting on the Job, DiSP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1998,
at 51.
175 This issue received nationwide attention following an assault on December 1,
1997 by Latrell Sprewell, a professional basketball player for the Golden State Warriors
of the National Basketball Association, against his head coach P.J. Carlesimo during a
326
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arbitrators' authority is very evident in this area. Despite the fact that
criminal law and tort law constitute an overwhelming basis for clear, well-
defined, and dominant public policy against acts or threats of physical
violence, and laws and regulations require the maintenance of safe
workplaces, 176 courts have consistently refused to vacate on public policy
grounds arbitration awards reinstating employees who threaten or commit
acts of violence.
For instance, in United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers,17 7 the Third Circuit reversed a district court's decision to
vacate on public policy grounds an arbitrator's award reinstating a postal
employee who fired two bullets into the windshield of his supervisor's car.
The employee had alleged he Was a victim of racial discrimination after
being repeatedly passed over for promotion and on the morning before his
offense he had again been told he would not be promoted. 178 The arbitrator
determined that the employee had been propelled to act violently by this
perceived racial animus, and since he had no prior record of discipline
suspension was the appropriate penalty. 179
A federal district court vacated this award on public policy grounds, prior
to the Supreme Court issuing its decision in Misco, on the basis of "'an
indisputable public policy against permitting an employee to direct physical
violence at a superior, and an equally compelling policy against forcing that
superior to again employ the man.""' 180 The Third Circuit reversed this
decision, stating that Misco required reviewing courts to find a violation of
team practice. The resulting arbitration award which found no just cause for termination
of Sprewell's employment contract with the Warriors, and reduced his league-imposed
suspension from one year to the eight months for the remaining 1997-1998 season, was
heavily criticized. In re Nat'l Baskeball Players Ass'n et. aL, 548 PLI/PAT 429 (1998);
see Tim Keown, Irrational Act Follows Another, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Mar. 5, 1998
at D1. Interestingly, Sprewell challenged the resulting award on several grounds,
including that it was contrary to California public policy against racial discrimination on
the basis that the award's dual punishment fomented racial animus. This argument, along
with the remainder of his appeal, was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Sprewell v. Golden
State Warriors, 231 F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 2000).
176 Section 5 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act requires employers to
provide working environments free from "hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm." 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1994).
177 United States Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 839 F.2d 146 (3d Cir.
1988).
178 Id. at 147.
179 Id. The arbitrator deemed the employee's thirteen years of discipline free
employment a "'bank of good will"' which combined with his excellent job performance
led him to conclude that if reinstated this employee was unlikely to repeat any acts of
violence. Id.180 Id. at 148 (quoting United States Postal Service, 663 F. Supp. at 119-20.
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some explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy in order to vacate an
award and no such policy existed requiring discharge of employees for acts
of violence. 181
In subsequent cases the Third Circuit still interpreted the meaning of
"well defined and dominant" public policy in this way but no longer insisted
that the public policy at issue require discharge in order to find a violation.
The court now applies the more lenient "inconsistent with public policy"
test. 182 Despite this broader approach, in G.B. Goldman Paper Co. v. United
Paperworkers International Union, Local 286,183 a district court refused to
vacate on public policy grounds an award reinstating an employee who
threatened and intimidated coworkers by verbal taunts and menacing acts.
In Goldman, the court determined that in order to vacate this award on
public policy grounds, it had to find that the reinstatement of an employee
who manifests violent tendencies and may harm others expressly violates
public policy in favor of ensuring workplace safety. 184 The court discussed
both United States Postal Service and E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Grasselli Employees Independent Association of East Chicago, Inc.,185 in
applying a test for determining whether "workplace safety public policy" is
violated that considers such factors as determining what danger a grievant
presents to others as well as a grievant's amenability to lesser discipline. 186
These cases involved reinstatement of violently behaving employees, but in
more recent cases involving nonviolent employees the Third Circuit has
applied broader public policy scrutiny. 187
181 Id. Here the Third Circuit interprets Misco as forbidding courts from asserting
the existence of a public policy without substantiating the laws and legal precedents on
which it is based, stating this is what differentiates "well-defined and dominant" public
policy from general concerns about public welfare. Id. (quoting United Paperworkers
Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987) (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union
759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757,
766 (1983)).
182 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union (Exxon 1), 993 F.2l 357 (3d Cir.
1993) . In Stroehman Bakeries Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F. 2d 1436
(3d Cir. 1992), the Third Circuit also took a broad view of public policy review by
vacating an award which "may" have violated public policy.
183 G.B. Goldman Paper Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 286, 957 F.
Supp. 607 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
184 Id. at 619-21.
185 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d
611 (7th Cir. 1986).
186 G.B. Goldman Paper Co., 957 F. Supp. at 620 (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 790 F.2d at 617).
187 See Exxon I-III, supra note 98.
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Though the approach of the district court in Goldman mirrors that of
courts in other jurisdictions that adhere to narrow views of Misco review,188
the court in Goldman ignored the broader "inconsistent with public policy"
test prevailing in the Third Circuit. It is unclear why an award reinstating a
demonstrably violent employee deserves unique treatment when it may
violate safety public policy meant to prevent workplace violence.
At least one district court in another jurisdiction has followed
Goldman,189 even though it seems contrary to the prevailing law governing
public policy review in the Third Circuit. Given the increased frequency and
seriousness of current incidents of violence in the workplace, broader review
of awards implicating these concerns may ensue as public policy in this area
becomes more specific and prevalent.
IX. PATIENT ABUSE AND MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE
Public and private health care facilities for the mentally ill or infirm are
heavily regulated by federal law.190 This is to guarantee adequate standards
of care for clients in these facilities and to protect them from potential
abuses. Such health care providers are therefore subject to strong public
policies in favor of protecting patients from abusive or negligent caregivers,
and as such awards reinstating abusive health care employees may be
vacated. 191
Nevertheless, despite clear and dominant public policy favoring
protection of patients, courts have still applied the public policy exception
narrowly when reviewing awards which reinstated abusive employees. In
Jacksonville Area Association for Retarded Citizens v. General Service
Employees Union, Local 73,192 a district court upheld an award reinstating
188 Int'l Union v. Micro Mfg., 895 F. Supp. 170 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (granting
summary judgment to union on finding that no public policy forbids reinstatement of an
employee who physically assaults the owner of the company); Colum. Aluminum Corp. v.
United Steelworkers, Local 8147, 922 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Wash. 1995) (refusing to vacate
on public policy grounds an award reinstating an employee who had a physical altercation
with a coworker, noting that no public policy barred his reinstatement).
189 Bunting Bearings Corp. v. Local 7450, 158 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2991 (N.D. Ohio
1998) (holding that no public policy forbids reinstatement of an employee who spat in the
face of a coworker, citing G.B. Goldman Paper Co., 957 F. Supp. 607.).
19 0 Mental Health Systems Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-398, 94 Stat. 1564 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill
Individuals Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-51 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
191 Highland Hosp. v. AFSCME Dist. 84, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1287 (vacating an
award which reinstated a patient care assistant who shoved an Alzheimer's patient).
192 Jacksonville Area Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Gen. Serv. Employees Union,
Local 73, 888 F. Supp. 901, 908 (C.D. Ill. 1995).
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four employees of a not-for-profit corporation providing services to
physically and mentally impaired individuals after these employees abused a
patient but did not cause physical injury. The arbitrator found that though the
employees' behavior was clearly improper, discharge was unwarranted. 193 In
refusing to vacate the award on public policy grounds the court noted that
despite significant public policy against any abuses of mentally impaired
individuals, reinstatement of these employees did not violate any specific
expressions of that policy. 194
Further, in Maggio v. Local 1199,195 a district court upheld an award
reinstating an employee who on several occasions had physically mistreated
patients in a residential nursing and health care facility. Here the employee
was discharged following reports of physical abuse of four elderly
patients. 196 However, an arbitrator reviewing the case determined that the
employee's "rough handling" of these patients was not intended to harm
them, and ruled that suspension was the appropriate penalty. 197
Both the employer and the state commissioner responsible for oversight
of such private nursing facilities sought to vacate the award on the grounds it
violated explicit public policy against mistreatment of patients in nursing
facilities.198 While the district court acknowledged that the reinstatement of a
patient abuser would clearly violate public policy, it still refused to vacate
this award. 199
193 Id. at 904. The arbitrator reasoned that a suspension without back-pay was
sufficient discipline.
194 Id. at 908. ("[The JAARC cannot identify any statute or regulation that prohibits
the reinstatement of the employees under the circumstances .. ."). The court described
the conduct of these employees as "revolting" and amounting to mental abuse clearly
contrary to public policy but found itself bound by a narrow interpretation of the public
policy exception requiring that their reinstatement also had to be forbidden in order to
vacate the award. Id. at 909.
195 Maggio v. Local 1199, 702 F. Supp. 989 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
196 Id. at 990.
197 Id. at 991. The arbitrator reasoned that the employee was merely careless in his
conduct, rushing his work at times and not realizing how his size and strength could
cause discomfort to the patients in his care. Id.
198 Id. at 993. The employer specifically pointed to N.Y. Pub. Health L. § 2803-c,
which outlines the rights of patients in private residential health care facilities to receive
proper treatment and protection from mental and physical abuses, and § 2803-d, which
requires reporting and investigation of instances of "suspected 'physical abuse,
mistreatment or neglect"' of patients in such facilities. Id.
199 Id. at 996. ("If Maggio's characterization [of the grievant as a patient abuser]
were correct, the Court would be inclined to agree that reinstatement violated public
policy.").
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The court reasoned the arbitrator's determination that discharge was
unwarranted because the employee's conduct was unintentional in fact
reinforced the public policy at issue because it supported the view that any
intentional abuse by nursing home employees would lead to their
discharge.200 In drawing this distinction between negligent and intentional
abuse the court ruled that the public policy at issue was not undermined
because there was an insufficient link between reinstatement of this
employee and violation of the policy forbidding abuse of patients, a
requirement the court believed was inherent to the reasoning of the justices in
Misco.201
This analysis is also instructive when reviewing cases where health care
employees were reinstated after misconduct or negligence in the performance
of their duties. Employers may seek to terminate health care employees who
commit isolated, inadvertent mistakes simply because they are concerned
about potential tort liabilities. While a pattern of poor job performance and
additional misconduct will likely result in an arbitrator upholding an
employee's discharge, 202 single acts of negligent conduct may only lead to
suspension.20 3 Consequently, awards reinstating medical employees who
have committed isolated acts of negligence may violate public policy
depending on the nature and frequency of past errors.
For instance, courts have refused to vacate awards reinstating medical
employees who committed acts of negligence despite the fact their employers
deemed them unfit to perform their jobs. In Brigham & Women's Hospital v.
Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n,204 a federal district court upheld an arbitrator's
award reinstating a nurse who in the opinion of her superiors was incapable
of fulfilling her duties. This nurse had been reprimanded on more than one
occasion for disobeying superiors, leaving patients unattended, failing to
promptly notify doctors when a patient's condition changed rapidly for the
200 Id. ("Indeed, a fair reading of the Award reveals that the arbitrator's opinion is
completely in line with the policy [at issue].").
201 Id. at 992. ("Fatal to vacation of the award [in Misco] was the lower court's
failure to demonstrate a sufficient link between enforcement of the award and violation of
the previously identified public policy.").
202 Titusville Hosp., 86 LA 597, 599-600 (1985) (upholding the discharge of a nurse
who on more than one occasion administered improper doses of medication and then
tried to cover up her errors, noting that while even the most competent nurses make errors
failure to report such mistakes warrants discharge).
203 Wis. Dep't of Health & Soc. Serv., 90 LA 333, 337 (1998) (upholding the three
day suspension of a nurse who medicated a patient and failed to prepare a record of it
afterwards).
204 Brigham & Women's Hosp. v. Mass. Nurses Ass'n, 684 F. Supp. 1120 (D.
Mass. 1988).
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worse, and generally failing to meet basic nursing standards. 205 The hospital
finally discharged her after she failed to properly administer a patient's
medication. 206 However, the arbitrator refused to uphold her discharge, citing
the hospital's failure to follow its own disciplinary policies in reaching its
decision. 207
The hospital sought to vacate the award on the grounds it violated
Massachusetts public policy in favor of employing only competent persons
as registered nurses.208 The reviewing court acknowledged that state
regulations establishing qualifications for registered nurses constituted
sufficiently well-defined and explicit public policy under Misco favoring
employment of only competent nurses.20 9 However, the court refused to
vacate on these grounds because the arbitrator did not find her incompeteint
to perform her duties when deciding she should be reinstated, and as such her
reinstatement did not violate public policy.210
Had the arbitrator in Brigham agreed with the hospital and determined
that the nurse was incompetent but still reinstated her due to the hospital's
procedural failures when taking disciplinary action, it seems likely given the
court's reasoning that the award would have violated public policy. Since the
job performance of a health care employee so directly affects the well being
of individual patients, arbitrators must be especially wary of violating public
policy by reinstating medical employees who are demonstrably negligent in
performing their job duties.211
205 Id. at 1121.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 1122. The arbitrator determined that no just cause existed for discharge
because of 1) the hospital's failure to follow its own disciplinary rule to "forgive" certain
misconduct after one year, effectively wiping it off an employee's personnel record, 2) its
failure to notify the employee, in accordance with hospital policy, of negative comments
about her performance, and 3) its failure to demonstrate that her conduct fell within one
of three categories of terminable offenses: "gross" misconduct, conduct for which an
employee had already received two warnings, or conduct for which an employee had
already been suspended. The arbitrator also felt the employee was subjected to disparate
treatment since other nurses had committed equally serious mistakes without any
penalties. Id.
208 Id. at 1125. The hospital pointed to relevant Massachusetts administrative
regulations in support of its argument.
209 Id. at 1125. ("[T]he Hospital is arguably correct in asserting the regulations
establish a public policy that RN's be competent.").
210 Id. at 1125. The court opined that her conduct amounted to failures to follow
proper procedures rather than incompetence and noted that she had an excellent work
record apart from these incidents. Id.
211 Russell Memorial Hosp. Ass'n. v. United Steelworkers, 720 F. Supp. 583, 587
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (rejecting Brigham and finding that reinstatement of a licensed nurse
who was reprimanded more than once for improper work and insubordination and who
332
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However, even where courts have recognized clear and well-defined
public policy exists favoring safe and competent nursing care, awards
reinstating medical employees who executed their duties negligently will not
be disturbed. In Mid Michigan Regional Medical Center-Clare v.
Professional Employees Division of Local 79,212 the Sixth Circuit confirmed
an award which reinstated a nurse who had mishandled equipment during an
emergency and on other occasions. The court noted that an award reinstating
a hospital employee who makes "frequent, life-threatening errors" would
violate public policy.213 However, in this instance the arbitrator had not
ordered the nurse to be reinstated to an emergency unit where such errors
would be more likely to occur.214
Despite concerns about arbitrators reinstating poorly performing medical
employees, it is also unlikely that an arbitrator would violate public policy by
merely deciding that a certain employee is suitably qualified for a medical
position, even if this award is contrary to the professional opinions of a
hospital's staff.215 Arbitrators are selected to interpret and fulfill the parties'
intent as expressed in the terms of a contract, and in doing so receive wide
latitude despite the public policy exception or other forms of review. In cases
involving medical personnel, like others, the standard for public policy
review will be strict and absent express provisions on an individual's return
to a medical position public policy vacatur is very unlikely.
also failed to properly administer cardiac medication violated the public policy, as
expressed in Michigan's licensing requirements for nurses, in favor of ensuring safe and
competent nursing care). Contra UPMC, Braddock v. Teamsters Local 250, Int'l Bhd. Of
Teamsters, 32 F. Supp.2d 231 (W.D.Pa. 1998) (distinguishing Russell in affirming award
reinstating with a ninety day suspension a psychiatric technician who negligently failed to
keep a suicidal patient under observation and thereby placed the patient in jeopardy, but
also determining that such negligent failure to perform medical duties did violate public
policy favoring protection of the mentally ill because the relevant statutes expressing that
policy do not distinguish between intentionally and negligently created dangers to
psychiatric patients).
2 12 Mid Mich. Reg'l Med. Ctr.-Clare v. Profl Employees Div. of Local 79, 183 F.3d
497 (6th Cir. 1999).
213 Id. at 504.
214 Id. at 500-01.
215 N. Adams Reg'l Hosp. v. Mass. Nurses Ass'n, 889 F. Supp. 507, 513-14 (D.
Mass. 1995), affid on other grounds, 74 F.3d 346 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that the
arbitrator did not violate public policy by awarding a staffing position to an internal
candidate where the hospital determined that only an external candidate selected by
medical staff was sufficiently qualified for the open position; while the arbitrator agreed
that the external candidate was more qualified, the internal candidate was at least
"minimally" qualified and hence entitled to the position under the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement).
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X. CONCLUSION
In the post Misco era the requirement for courts to find a violation of
clear, well-defined, and dominant public policy has made it very unlikely that
an arbitrators' award will be vacated on these grounds. But it is also clear
that arbitration awards implicating public policy are not completely shielded.
Courts may vacate on public policy grounds awards reinstating employees
who create physical danger to themselves or others, awards reinstating
employees likely to repeat sexually harassing conduct, or awards reinstating
chronically negligent medical employees. Whether a court will do so largely
depends on whether the particular reviewing court looks for violations of
public policy in the misconduct of the employee or the terms of the
arbitrator's award. The various federal circuit courts should all apply the
narrow approach, examining the terms of an award for violations of public
policy since it is those terms which reflect the parties' contractual agreement.
As illustrated herein arbitrators who reinstate employees found to have
committed certain conduct may still risk vacatur on public policy grounds if
in the totality of the relevant positive law there exists some prohibition
against the treatment of that conduct in the terms of an award. Parties who
have agreed to arbitrate their contractual disputes should remain aware of the
ever changing and expanding body of statutes, regulations, and even
common law on which public policy may be based, because awards resolving
their disputes may be successfully challenged on these grounds. Like a "Hail
Mary" pass such challenges will occasionally, though very infrequently,
succeed.
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